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Introduction 
 
Shane Ewens’ excellent history of the Fire Service ‘Fighting Fires’ (2010) shows how Scottish 
firefighters and Scottish services have been integral to the development of the UK fire service 
since James Braidwood established the first municipal service in Edinburgh following the great 
fire of 1824. Generally known as the father of firefighting he was the first person to try to introduce 
a systematic method of controlling firefighting rather than simply responding and trying to cope. 
Braidwood transformed the perceptions and realities of urban firefighting during the 
industrialization of the 19th century. He went on to establish the London Fire Engine 
Establishment in 1833, the precursor to the Metropolitan Fire Brigade of 1866. From the early 19th 
century to the end of the 20th there was little to differentiate the scale scope and nature of the 
service in Scotland from those south of the border, as the Edinburgh ‘model’ has been  adopted 
by in all the great Victorian cities, such as Glasgow, Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham, Leeds 
and many more. 
 
Recent studies (Audit Scotland 2015, NAO 2015a 2015b, Murphy 2015a 2015b) have highlighted 
significant differences in the governance, performance and the response to the challenges of the 
current era of austerity in the two countries. Although the arrangements prior to 2010 were 
remarkably similar, since 2010 they have diverged as public sector reform in general, and reform 
of the fire sector in particular, have generated alternative policy and delivery responses, although 
both have embraced the move from a reactive service to a greater emphasis on prevention and 
protection. Nevertheless it provides an excellent opportunity to evaluate the alternative approaches 
in what where previously two very similar regimes.     
 
This chapter therefore explores how Scottish fire and rescue services have evolved in the 21st 
century, after the Scottish Parliament was established in 1999 and focusses more specifically on 
the period 2010-2015, when the  purpose, legislation, structure, objectives, and performance all 
began to diverge from their English equivalents. Following devolution, the transfer of 
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responsibility for fire and rescue has gradually moved from Westminster to the Scottish Executive. 
Although Scotland, is still regulated by UK-wide legislation such as the Civil Contingencies Act 
(2004), the country now enacts its own legislation on the delivery of most public services, including 
fire and rescue (Mackie, 2013).  
 
Scotland was not subject to the Fire and Rescue Service Act of 2004 but had its own (very similar) 
Fire and Rescue Services Act of 2005, to embrace the challenges of modernizing the service 
outlined in Chapter 2. The subsequent Police and Fire Reform Act1 (2012) however, culminated 
in the establishment of both a single national Fire and Rescue Service  (FRS) for Scotland and a 
new Fire and Rescue Framework in 2013, both significantly different to their equivalents  in 
England. The equivalent arrangements in Wales are discussed in Chapter 13. 
 
This chapter will examine Scotland’s recent approach to the structure and management of its fire 
and rescue services. Moreover, the period from 2010 to 2015 reflects considerable changes to 
public service management and delivery across the UK. Despite being subject to similar funding 
constraints under the Coalition governments macro-economic approach to ‘austerity’ (Blyth, 2015; 
O’Hara, 2015; Schui, 2014), Scotland has taken a very different approach to its public service 
design and delivery than that adopted by England. By 2015, the new governance structure in 
Scotland was very different to England and despite a significant transition clear demonstrable 
improvement was being achieved in terms of both operational performance and efficiency savings 
(Audit Scotland 2015). Whilst an explicit comparison of Scotland with England is not the main 
aim of this chapter, the focus on Scotland nevertheless invites comparisons to be drawn by readers 
who are familiar with the English context.  The chapter concludes with brief identification of what 
might be some of the challenges facing the ongoing development of the single fire and rescue 
service in Scotland.   
 
 
 
Setting the scene for reform in Scottish fire and rescue services 
 
In 1973, as a result of local government re-organisation 11 fire brigades were amalgamated into 
eight based on the 32 local authority areas. In 2010 the eight Scottish services eight separate Fire 
and Rescue Services (FRS), comprised eight separate headquarter buildings with 76 whole-time 
fire stations, 241 retained stations and 63 volunteer stations. There were approximately 4,300 
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whole-time firefighters, 3,000 retained duty firefighters, 234 control room staff, and 1,129 other 
support staff.  The service was also assisted by 473 volunteer firefighters (Scottish Government, 
2011c).  
 
Insert Map 
 
The Fire Scotland Act (2005) continued the status of the services as ‘local’ authority services with 
governance overseen by Fire and Rescue Authorities (FRA).  Although Scottish ministers were 
given powers to further combine areas of two or more FRAs into a joint fire and rescue service 
(Scottish Government, 2011). Thus, at 2010 there were two unitary fire services which covered 
the local authority areas of Dumfries and Galloway and Fife; and six joint fire services, which 
served more than one local authority area, in Grampian, Tayside, Central, Lothian and Borders, 
Highlands and Islands and Strathclyde.  
 
As with the 2004 Act in England (see Chapter 3), the 2005 Act generally increased the roles and 
responsibilities of the Scottish services. Whilst the eight FRAs were granted more freedom to 
determine how resources were allocated based on local needs, this was balanced against greater 
responsibilities in delivering a broader role for the service, including greater emphasis on fire 
prevention and protection and the need to build greater national resilience against increased threats 
from global terrorism and extreme weather conditions. The establishment of ‘Scottish Resilience’, 
in 2008, combined the Scottish Fire Services College (the sectors national training and 
organisational development centre), with the Scottish Government’s Fire and Civil Contingencies 
Division in order to strengthen Scotland’s resilience to major emergencies.  
 
Scottish minsters were also given more autonomy to determine the strategic direction of the 
service. A new governance structure replaced the previous statutory central advisory structure with 
a non-statutory arrangement through the Ministerial Advisory Group (MAG). The Fire Scotland 
Act (2005) expected the strategic direction of the service to be informed by a National Fire and 
Rescue framework which would set out priorities, objectives and guidance for the FRAs. Between 
2005 and 2010, Scottish FRS were subject to less independent scrutiny and audit than in England. 
English FRS had been independently audited under the Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA) 
and Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) regimes both of which published regular 
reports on service performance. In Scotland, under the Best Value process, there was only one 
independent review of the process  in 2006 (Grace et al 2007), followed by a progress review in 
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2007/8. The lack of regular independent performance review made it more difficult to measure 
progress in improvements in outcomes against the first national framework. By 2010, it was 
recognised that the development of more robust independent review was critical to the successful 
evolution of Scottish FRS (e.g. Scottish Government, 2010).  
 
In a consultation document on the future of the fire and rescue service in Scotland (Scottish 
Government, 2011), the Scottish Government set out the following vision: 
[The Scottish] “Government is committed to working with stakeholders to ensure that 
the SFRS becomes a world class, public-focused emergency service at the heart of 
community resilience, with the capacity, flexibility and scale to provide 21st century 
fire and rescue capabilities to protect the public.” (Scottish Government, 2011, p.5) 
 
This vision was underpinned by key objectives to make Scotland ‘wealthier and fairer, smarter, healthier, 
safer and stronger and greener’, and supported by 15 national outcomes for Scotland. The consultation 
argued that the Scottish fire and rescue service has an important role to play in the delivery of 
these outcomes. In particular, it contributed directly to outcome 11: ‘strong resilient and supportive 
communities, where people take responsibility for their own actions and how they affect others’ and outcome 15: 
‘public services are high quality, continually improving, efficient and responsive to local people’s needs’. It is notable 
that the language used by the Scottish government to describe its public services reflects a strong 
orientation towards ideas of ‘public value’, ‘public governance’ and ‘public service’ (see Benington 
& Moore 2014, Bovaird & Loeffler, 2016; Osborne, 2010, Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015), whereby 
the users of public services are seen as citizens with responsibilities rather than from a managerial 
or NPM perspective where they are merely consumers of services. Indeed, in its key principles for 
fire and rescue, the consultation document stated that the service should ‘demonstrate best practice 
in public sector governance’. As such, its key principles and vision revolved around creating a 
public service which was (to be) sustainable, locally responsive and accountable2. 
 
Despite a clear vision, the Scottish government recognised some key challenges faced by the 
service (Scottish Government, 2011). These included the need to improve community fire safety 
and respond to increased expectations from the public. Yet, despite positive performance based 
on data in 2009-103, fire deaths in Scotland remained high, relative to the rest of the UK. Overall 
deaths were 50% more likely in Scotland than England In vulnerable groups, such as people with 
mental health problems, a particular high group for risk of death from fire. As in England the 2005 
Act resulted in a move away from prescriptive standards of fire cover determined centrally, towards 
Integrated Risk Management Planning (IRMP). Under IRMP, each service is required to prioritise 
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its resources based on a systematic assessment of the risks to life and property in its area. The aim 
of IRMP is to recognise the relationship between risks and resources, and to use this information 
as a planning tool to ensure consistent service delivery. IRMP recognises the critical role of 
prevention as part of the vision for fire and rescue. Yet despite the local focus of IRMP, a review 
in 2010 recommended the development of a complementary national/regional IRMP to enable 
economies of scale, collaboration and sharing of services such as human resources, IT and fire 
investigation (Scottish Fire and Rescue Advisory Unit, 2010).  
 
In order to deliver a more economic, efficient and effective FRS, the need to improve training and 
development and develop wider collaboration with other blue light services was also recognised. 
However, the structure of eight separate FRAs had resulted in considerable duplication of training 
provision. Moreover, it was argued the ability to work collaboratively with partner agencies was 
potentially inhibited by the need to have eight separate but simultaneous discussions on similar 
areas of interest.  
 
The unprecedented budget cuts facing Scotland (and England)only exacerbated these challenges. 
The coalition government’s policy response to the recession led to direct cuts in public spending 
across the whole UK, including those available for fire and rescue services. Given this financial 
climate, a structure of eight separate services for a relatively small country such as Scotland made 
significant improvements of the service appear difficult. It was also likely that under the existing 
structure, individual fire services would have needed to make cuts in expenditure that would have 
disproportionately reduced frontline services in some areas more than others. However, the 
Scottish Government believed the public increasingly expected consistent delivery of services, 
whichever area they live in. 
 
In their manifestos for the 2011 Scottish elections, all three of the biggest parties, at that time the 
Scottish National Party (SNP), the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats, acknowledged the 
potential benefits of a single service with the SNP and Labour the strongest advocates.  
 
By 2011 the Scottish Government, (which was now under a majority Scottish National Part 
government) and the main opposition parties were individually and collectively beginning to 
acknowledge a potentially strong case for structural reform of the Scottish fire and rescue service. 
Within the context of significant financial challenges and the need to provide Best Value, the 
Scottish government commissioned a report on the future delivery of its public services (Christie 
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Commission, 2011). This was soon followed by ‘Renewing Scotland’s Public Services’ (Scottish 
Government, 2011b).  
 
The reform of public services in Scotland 
 
The Christie Commission4 report (2011) set out the context for change in Scottish public services 
mentioned above earlier. The priorities for reform were outlined in ‘Renewing Scotland’s Public 
Services’ (Scottish Government, 2011b).  
“The pressure on budgets is intense and public spending is not expected to return to 
2010 levels in real terms for 16 years…unless Scotland embraces a radical, new 
collaborative culture throughout our public services, both budgets and provision will 
buckle under the strain.” (Christie Commission, 2011, p. viii) 
 
Demographic5 and social factors also put a strain on the demand for public services. Inequalities 
across Scotland accounted for a significant element of this increased demand. In general, it was 
estimated that up to 40% of all spending on public services was on interventions that could have 
been avoided by taking a more preventative approach. Focussing resources on further preventative 
measures in order address these inequalities therefore became a key objective of reforms.  Yet, it 
was also recognised that the organisation of public services prior to this review was plagued by 
systemic problems which made addressing these inequalities difficult. Services were fragmented, 
complex and lacking in transparency and accountability. They were also organised in a top-down 
way with the Scottish Government as the main arbiter, and were thus unresponsive to the needs 
of their local communities. These problems made working with other partner agencies difficult, 
and therefore limited the ability of the services to deliver improved outcomes and address 
inequalities. The priorities for renewal of Scottish public services (Scottish Government, 2011b) 
aimed to align public services with the key objectives of the Christie review. This centred on four 
areas; Prevention, Integrated Local Services, Workforce and Leadership, and Improving Performance.  
 
Whilst the case for reform of fire and rescue services had been made in the public consultation 
(see above), it was not yet clear how fire and rescue services should now be structured and 
delivered. The case for how reform should happen was put forward in an Initial Options Appraisal 
Report (IOAR) and further reviewed in the Outline Business Case (OBC) (Scottish Government, 
2011c, 2011d). The IOAR included full evaluations of 14 options and was presented to the MAG 
at the end of 2010.  The MAG agreed that further work was needed to appraise the shortlisted 
options with all relevant stakeholders.  Stakeholder workshops were held with acknowledged 
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experts. In addition, a series of visits to each separate fire and rescue service were undertaken with 
a view to building a comprehensive understanding of how fire and rescue services were delivered 
in relation to six key aspects; 
 customers, 
 outcomes and products,  
 processes,  
 people and governance,  
 physical assets, and 
 information and technology.  
 
This information was used to further evaluate the cost, benefits, opportunities and risks of the 
options shortlisted by the IOAR.  
 
The 3 options for reform considered most viable6, included in the public consultation on reform 
(Scottish Government, 2011), and fully evaluated in the OBC, were: 
 The existing eight service model but with greater collaboration encouraged and facilitated; 
 A regional model with an, as yet unspecified number of regions (but commonly assumed 
to be 3), to fit with wider public service reforms 
 A single national fire and rescue service 
 
It was calculated that, even after accounting for the costs of transition, option three would deliver 
significantly greater long-term efficiency savings1 and greater recurrent annual financial savings 
than either option one or two. Such savings could then be re-invested to protect frontline services. 
Option three also scored more highly in terms of non-monetary benefits and outcomes, including 
the ability of fire and rescue to engage closely with local communities, respond quickly to future 
challenges, and simplify its delivery mechanisms.  
 
The potential improvement of outcomes cannot be as easily quantified as other benefits but were 
nevertheless important. The ability of the service to improve outcomes such as fire deaths was a 
key factor underpinning the need for reform of fire and rescue and of Scottish public services 
more generally, as discussed by the Christie Commission (2011). The most important outcome 
identified for FRS was the improvement of service outcomes. These are described along with 
examples to illustrate how they might be achieved in Table 1. The OBC concluded that option 
three had the most potential to deliver desired key outcome levels. 
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Table 1. Outcomes with examples to indicate how they might be achieved 
Improved service outcomes Examples that might illustrate success 
Translation of the national outcomes into local priorities 
through the contribution of FRS to deliver of Single 
Outcome Agreements (SOA).  
The delivery model should facilitate enhanced 
participation in the SOA processes and in local 
partnership working.  
Improving preparedness for, response to and recovery 
from emergencies.  
A standardised and more resilient approach to any 
emergency which occurs anywhere in Scotland, 
facilitating the movement of personnel, vehicles and 
equipment through the standardisation of equipment 
and procedures and a clearly defined command 
structure.  
Improving both community and fire fighter safety. Standardisation of policies, procedures and partnership 
agreements as well as the strategic distribution of assets 
across Scotland to ensure adequate cover for the whole 
country.  
Ensuring appropriate and risk-based provision of fire 
stations, fire appliances and crews and civil 
contingencies specialists to secure improved service.  
How the delivery model offers opportunities to ensure 
that an appropriate and risk-based provision of 
resources is maintained across Scotland to ensure 
adequate deployment times when they are required.  
Contributing to overall economic growth by mitigating 
the social and economic impact which fires and other 
emergencies can be expected to have on individuals, 
commerce, industry, the environment and heritage.  
The delivery model offers opportunities to develop 
more co-ordinated and consistent approaches across 
Scotland to targeting groups at increased risk, through 
more effective education, awareness and enforcement 
of the delivery process.  
Source: Adapted from Outline Business Case (Scottish Government, 2011d) 
  
A single service structure would cover the whole of Scotland with a single leadership and 
governance structure and national approach to service delivery. National standards would help to 
deliver consistency in performance across Scotland. A single service structure would also enable a 
uniform approach to IRMP, recognised as important during its review in 2010 (see above).  
 
Although reform towards a single service required a greater move from the status quo and was 
therefore considered a greater risk, it nevertheless emerged as the preferred option. Following 
public consultation, the decision was made to implement option three, i.e. to establish a single 
national fire and rescue service and to provide a new fire and rescue framework with objectives 
against which the performance of the new service could be measured.  
 
The new Scottish Fire and Rescue Service (SFRS) and Fire and Rescue Framework 
 
The single Scottish fire and rescue service (SFRS) and Fire and Rescue Framework were both 
established in April 2013. The Police and Fire Reform Scotland Act (2012) provided a statutory 
basis for the merger of eight separate FRSs each with their own sets of executive and command 
staff as well as back office functions. The SFRS is now a single body which is governed and 
managed by a board and strategic leadership team appointed by Scottish ministers. The board 
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provides strategic direction, support and guidance to the SFRS, ensuring that it operates effectively 
and that the Scottish Government’s priorities are implemented. Board members are personally and 
corporately accountable for the board’s actions and decisions. They also scrutinise plans and 
proposals and hold the Chief Officer and Senior Leadership Team to account. 
 
The service is organised into three Service Delivery Areas (SDAs) each with its own headquarters; 
one in Aberdeen (North SDA); one in Edinburgh (East SDA) and one in Hamilton (West SDA). 
Across the three SDAs there are 17 Local Senior Officers (working with clusters of co-terminus 
local authorities) responsible for resource management and engagement with local partners to 
deliver response and community safety strategies. The running of the local service areas is overseen 
by a Deputy Chief Officer, responsible for corporate performance of the service. The whole of 
the service delivery and strategic planning is overseen and managed by a single Chief Officer.  
 
Although the decision had now been made, this was recognised as only the start of a significant 
period of reform for Scottish fire and rescue. The framework for fire and rescue (Scottish 
Government, 2013) set out the strategic priorities and objectives of the new service; these priorities 
cover three key areas; improving service outcomes; equal access to specialist services and stronger 
engagement with communities. It also mirrored the shift in emphasis from property to people and 
from response to prevention. The intentions of each and how the service intended to meet them 
are summarised below:  
 
Improving service outcomes and protecting frontline services 
 
The key priorities within this area cover ‘risk management’, ‘prevention and protection’, ‘response 
and resilience’, and ‘the workforce’. In terms of risk management, the SFRS is responsible for 
reducing (fire-related) deaths in communities, and mitigating the economic and social impacts of 
fires on those communities. As such, it needs to both identify the risks and assess them so that 
they can be prioritised and adequate resource can be targeted to those communities most at risk. 
Risk management processes and mechanisms of service delivery (prevention, protection and 
response) are complementary, with each informing the other.  To be effective in improving 
outcomes, all depend heavily on planning and forming close partnerships with other agencies. For 
instance, the SRFS needs to maintain close links with other agencies such as the coastguard and 
Mountain rescue, so that its responders are provided with relevant and timely risk information. To 
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aid in prevention, Local Senior Officers (see above) need to work with partners to identify areas 
most at risk, i.e. vulnerable communities, properties and the individuals that live within them.  
 
There is an explicit emphasis on a highly skilled ‘workforce’ which focusses on Learning and 
Development. The intention is for learning and development systems to play a crucial role so that 
the workforce is able to learn from operational incidents and use this knowledge to improve service 
outcomes. The Scottish Fire Services College was to become a centre of excellence to assist in this 
learning and development8.  
 
More equal access to specialist resources and national capacity 
 
In addition to fire-related duties, the SFRS have a broader remit as set out within the 2005 Act to 
can respond to any incident or emergency where there is a threat to life or to the environment. 
These other incidents or emergencies include rope and water rescue. The SFRS also provides wider 
services, such as rescue of people trapped in lifts, animal rescues, or making buildings safe. Within 
the context of a single service structure it was recognised that there should be a conscious effort 
to ensure that all communities have equal access to specialist services, resources and national 
capacity where necessary (e.g. to respond to severe weather conditions such as flooding).  
 
Strengthened connection between the SFRS and communities 
 
The move away from eight services could have been considered or counterintuitively, risky and 
potentially counter-productive in light of the need for Scottish fire and rescue to become more 
responsive to the needs of local communities. Any single service would need to be underpinned 
by a structure that strengthened rather than weakened engagement with, and understanding of, 
local needs. Dedicated Local Senior Officers were appointed by the Chief Fire Officer (in 
consultation with the local authorities) to be the primary point contact and  accountable for local 
service delivery. Each of the 17 Local Senior Officers have to work with their local authorities to 
develop priorities and objectives that reflect the needs of their local areas.  
 
Insert Map 
 
Local authorities are therefore now playing a key role in setting the national strategic direction of 
the SFRS. They also have a statutory duty to scrutinise the delivery of services in their local areas, 
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and provide feedback and recommendations on the improvement of the service to the Local 
Senior Officers.  The 2012 Act expects local delivery of fire and rescue services to become better 
integrated with community planning. As such, the Local Senior Officers are responsible for 
developing local fire and rescue plans, which must be approved by the local authority. In order to 
strengthen the links to local communities and become more responsive to their needs, the Local 
Senior Officers are responsible for describing how a local fire and rescue plan aims to meet locally 
identified priorities and outcomes. 
 
Governance and performance management in the new SFRS 
 
The new SFRS brought with it a new ‘landscape’ for structures of governance (Scottish 
Government, 2013). New governance and accountability arrangements are set out in the 
‘Governance and Accountability Framework Document’ (Scottish Government, 2013a). Public 
sector governance arrangements generally involve accountability mechanisms relative to the stated 
goals of the sector, e.g. effective service outcomes as in the case of the SFRS. It also usually 
includes the structures that clarify the responsibilities of the various stakeholders to the 
organisation, and the tools that could be used to assure accountability both internally and externally 
(Annisette, et al, 2013). National and local democratic accountabilities are the dominant 
mechanisms by which those in authority are held to account for the effective running of the SFRS. 
The new accountability framework includes the roles and responsibilities of Ministers, Scottish 
Government, the SFRS chair, board and Chief Officer.  
 
Roles and responsibilities demand good conduct from those in authority in order to meet the 
stated objectives of the SFRS. For instance, the Chief Fire Officer must ensure “…robust performance 
and risk management arrangements…to support the achievement of the SFRS’s aims and objectives and that 
facilitate comprehensive reporting to the board, the Scottish Government and the wider public” (Scottish 
Government, 2013a, p.6). Comprehensive reporting refers to transparency, which is also a key 
mechanism for ensuring effective governance by providing the openness needed to, amongst other 
things, prevent the abuse of power (Bovens et al., 2014). The SFRS has a statutory duty to provide 
the public as well as national and local government with access to its proceedings, papers and 
reports.  
 
Audit and scrutiny arrangements provide the tools needed to assure the accountability of the SFRS 
both internally for the purposes of internal control (to prevent fraud and theft), and externally for 
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its stakeholders including the Scottish Government and wider public. The Auditor General for 
Scotland (Audit Scotland) has the powers to examine value for money and financial performance. 
In addition, Her Majesty’s Chief Fire Service Inspector in Scotland (HMCFSIS) oversees 
operational inspection of the SFRS, including community safety engagement, staff learning and 
development, and policies and practices. Both bodies, i.e. HM Fire Service Inspectorate in Scotland 
(HMFSI) and Audit Scotland have a duty to undertake complementary scrutiny activity covering 
areas such as outcomes, service performance, partnership working and community planning. In 
practise they liaise closely and operate collaborately. Since 2010, Scotland has strengthened 
independent scrutiny of its FRS. In contrast in England unlike England, governance and 
performance management of the English fire and rescue service has been more influenced by 
notions of localism and sector-led improvement with a greater emphasis on ‘New Public 
Management’, particularly since the Coalition Government came to power in 2010 (DCLG, 2012, 
Downe et al., 2014, Murphy and Greenhalgh 2014, Murphy and Jones 2016). 
 
Arguably, the ultimate aim of effective governance is to help organisations achieve their objectives. 
Performance information can help with effective internal control and inform external stakeholders 
about how well the organisation is doing (Annisette, et al, 2013). Performance management regimes 
based upon notions of ‘Public Value’ would expect those responsible for service delivery to 
develop publicly accountable measures which demonstrate that objectives have been achieved and 
would emphasis public involvement (Moore, 1995, Benington and Moore, 2014). As such, the 
Scottish Government and the SFRS independent board define specific performance targets and 
the system uses independent audit and scrutiny arrangements to hold the SFRS accountable for 
their achievement. Scottish ministers hold the SFRS to account for performance against key 
targets. As detailed within the Fire and Rescue Framework and the SFRS’s Planning and 
Performance Management Framework (SFRS, 2014) these targets are: 
 Reducing fire fatalities and causalities  
 Reducing special service fatalities and casualties 
 Reducing accidental dwelling fires  
 Reducing the number of non-domestic fires 
 Reducing firefighter injuries 
 Reducing staff sickness absence 
 
The aim of the targets is to assess the realisation of reform benefits but also provide a basis for 
continuous improvement of the service. It is recognised that not all targets would be applicable at 
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the local level, and targets may need to be adapted to suit local risk profiles. The Planning and 
Performance Management framework developed by the SFRS in 2014, builds on the Fire and 
Rescue Framework to show how the SFRS plans to achieve the relevant targets. For instance, the 
document contains a high level strategy map to show the performance indicators which underpin 
the achievement of the high level targets and how the targets map to outcomes and the SFRS’s 
strategic aims.  
 
Conclusions  
 
Within the broader context of public service management and delivery, this chapter has sought to 
understand how and why Scottish fire and rescue services have evolved and changed since 
devolution. In particular, the chapter has emphasised reform of the Scottish fire and rescue services 
from eight separate services to a single service structure. The reasons for such reform were not 
unique to Scotland but indicative of a range of similar internal and external factors also experienced 
by other countries. For instance, most OECD countries (and many others) have experienced 
recession since 2008, producing falling tax revenues, increasing welfare payments and rising fiscal 
deficits (Bovaird and Loeffler, 2016). Cutting the cost of public services (rather than increasing 
taxes) has been adopted as the most appropriate response by many countries, including the UK.  
 
Nevertheless, despite the financial (and other) pressures faced by Scotland (which have been 
similar to the rest of the UK) the answer has not been a further entrenchment of ‘New Public 
Management’ philosophy, e.g. though the use of internal market mechanisms; often couched 
within the language of ‘choice’. Rather, in Scotland the aim has been to maintain a more ‘public 
interest/public value’ ethos behind the delivery of its public services; one that is built on reducing 
inequalities and generally aiming to improve the social and economic aspects of the lives of those 
in local communities. Notably, it is not assumed, that creating competition (through means of 
private sector involvement) is a more efficient way of doing so. The priority for reform of fire and 
rescue has been based around a philosophy that aims to deliver an improved service by reducing 
the duplication of services that could be shared as an alternative to cutting frontline services, which 
they argued would have made inequalities even worse in some communities. In conclusion, 
although there were evident financial constraints, the way in which Scotland has chosen to reform 
its fire and rescue service was based around notions of creating ‘public value’ and the delivery of 
an economic, efficient and effective service within a central ethos of fairness and equality across 
Scotland.  
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Democratic accountability is a key feature of Scottish public services. As such, in the SFRS 
governance mechanisms have been improved in order to strengthen (rather than weaken) public 
assurance. In addition to the government itself and the Board, Audit Scotland9 and HMSSI10 
provide strengthened independent scrutiny and oversight of the service against the 2013 Fire and 
Rescue Framework11, including the performance targets outlined earlier.  
 
In May 2015 Audit Scotland (Audit Scotland, 2015) concluded that the Scottish Government and 
the SFRS had managed the 2013 merger of  the eight legacy services effectively – The reform of  
Scottish fire and rescue through creation of  the SFRS had no detrimental impact on the public 
and its performance was improving. The move from eight local fire and rescue services to a 
national organisation had enhanced the scrutiny and challenge of  the fire and rescue service. 
Reported savings to date puts the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service on track to exceed expected 
savings of  £328 million by 2027/28”. (2015 p5). 
 
Scotland, at least in terms of  its Fire and Rescue Service, had witnessed a successful transformation 
project that demonstrated individual and collective leadership and a strategic and holistic approach 
to the service. It led to more robust Governance and Scrutiny arrangements and improved service 
outcomes. During the same period England saw an abdication of  leadership responsibilities, 
particularly from the DCLG minimal and ad hoc restructuring, resulting in loss of  public 
accountability, sub-optimal delivery and significant risks to the achievement of  Value for Money 
(NAO 2015a 2015b, Murphy 2015a, 2015b),     
 
During the time period covered in this chapter the nature, purpose and organisational structure of  
the service have changed. However, SFRS had not yet addressed reform of  the services operational 
stations which were scheduled for a later phase of  reform. At the time of  writing this chapter, the 
UK macro-economic policy which involves restricting resources to the public sector has been 
reconfirmed in a further three-year spending review. The outcome of  the EU referendum has led 
us into a further period of  economic turmoil and uncertainty. Moreover, in the Scottish elections 
of  2016, the SNP lost their overall majority and emerged as a minority government.  
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Notes 
 
1. Although the legislative framework and timetable have been similar for Fire Service and the new 
Police Services, implementation of reform in the police has proven far more problematical than 
in the Fire Service to-date. 
2. Sir Peter Housden the former Permanent Secretary of the ODPM and Department of 
Communities and Local Government (2005-2010) was Permanent Secretary of the Scottish 
Government from June 2010 to June 2015. 
3. 2009-10 data indicates a general decline in the number of all types of fires in Scotland, with rates 
down by a third across both primary and secondary fires.  Dwelling fires - where most fire 
fatalities occur - have shown a continuing decline, reflecting the focus on prevention activities. 
The figures for dwelling fires show a decrease of 30% since 1999 (Scottish government, 2011d). 
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4.  The make-up and conduct of the Christie Commission was very much in the spirit of former 
Royal Commissions of the past 
5. Projections suggested that the population of Scotland will rise from 5.19 million (as of June 2009) 
to 5.54 million by 2033.  It will also age significantly, with the numbers of people aged 60 and 
over increasing by 50% from 1.17m to 1.75m.  This, combined with the trend towards increasing 
numbers of elderly and single occupancy households, will increase dwelling fire risk”. (Scottish 
Government, 2011d, p.28) 
6. In the run up to the 2015 general election, the Shadow Fire Minister Lyn Brown MP issued a 
consultation on proposed structural changes to the Fire Services in England. This had 3 options 
– voluntary local mergers; a new regional structure based on the nine English regions and a single 
national service. When the Conservatives won the elction they preferred to bring forward 
proposals to allow Police and Crime Commissioners to take responsibility for Fire and Rescue 
Services.  
7.  Valued at £293m over 15 years compared with £215m for option 2. (Scottish Government, 
2011d) 
8. In England both the Fire Service College in Gloucestershire and the Emergency Planning College 
at Easingwold have been sold to private sector contractors.   
9. Since 2000 shortly after devolution Audit Scotland has been responsible for auditing both central 
and local government as well as the NHS in Scotland. In England these were previously divided 
between the Audit Commission and the National Audit Office. 
10. Unlike the Chief Fire and Rescue Advisor in England (who is a departmental civil servant), 
HMFSI in Scotland is independent of the government.  
11. At the time of writing a new Fire and Rescue Framework for 2016 is under public consultation. 
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